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One of the recent trends in dealing with the concept of lying has been 
to argue that the idea that one needs to deceive someone in order to lie 
has been accepted too hastily. In Lying and Insincerity Stokke shares 
this opinion and proposes a defi nition of lying based on the notion of 
common ground that includes bald-faced lies. Additionally, he rejects 
the idea that lying can be accomplished with pragmatic means such as 
conversational implicatures and proposes a formal distinction between 
lying and misleading. In this review, I present the content of Stokke’s 
book and critically discuss the two points mentioned above. 
Keywords: Lying, misleading, implicature, common ground, pre-
tence.
Andreas Stokke’s book Lying and Insincerity (2018) is a valuable ad-
dition to the debate about lying and deception that proliferated in the 
last decade or so.1 In what follows I will briefl y present the content 
of the book and then I will lay out my thoughts on some topics about 
which I disagree with the author. This disagreement should be read as 
a praise of the engaging content and presentation of the book. First of 
all, a few preliminaries about the general discussion about lying are in 
order.
An analysis of lying can be focused on the moral or on the concep-
tual dimension of the phenomenon. The fi rst approach deals with the 
moral (un)acceptability of lying and considers questions like the fol-
lowing: are all lies bad, are some lies worse than others, is misleading 
1 Another important one is the book Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and 
Politics, a collection of essays edited by Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke, 
published also in 2018 by Oxford University Press.
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better than lying? The second approach tries to provide a theoretical 
defi nition of lying and focuses on the features that differentiate it from 
similar phenomena, such as deception, misleading or bullshit. It could 
seem that the moral approach is normative in its nature and that the 
conceptual one is purely descriptive, but the strength of this kind of 
distinction should not be overestimated. In his book, Stokke focused on 
the nature of insincere speech, including the attitudes that lie behind 
them, and does not venture into the moral dimension of the discussion. 
Having said that, we can briefl y present the structure of Lying and 
Insincerity. The book is divided in two main parts: Language and At-
titudes. Chapters 1–5 are devoted to questions of language, and chap-
ters 6–10 to matters of attitudes that may lie behind insincere speech. 
As the author points out, insincere speech resides at the intersection 
between language and attitudes, which results in the two parts of the 
book being interrelated. More specifi cally, but still very generally, we 
can say that in the fi rst part of the book Stokke defends the idea that 
the intention to deceive the addressee is not crucial for lying and pro-
poses a distinction between lying and deception based on formal as-
pects of language, while in the second part he defends the idea that in 
order to lie one must only be insincere on a shallow, that is, conscious, 
level and analyses the connection between insincere attitudes and the 
phenomenon of bullshitting.
In Chapter 1, Stokke defends the idea that the intention to deceive 
the addressee should not be included in the defi nition of lying because 
it excludes cases that we would, according to the author, intuitively 
consider as instances of lying. That leads him to the conclusion that lies 
cannot be generally understood as a species of deception, even though 
lying is often aimed at deceiving its victims. Stokke endorses the posi-
tion that lies are insincere assertions, in the sense that a lie is a state-
ment that, although does not need to be false, has to be disbelieved 
by the speaker. As the author notes in the Introduction, “(t)he main 
challenge for a view of lying as insincere assertion is to spell out what 
it is to assert something in a way that is broad enough to capture the 
nature of lying and narrow enough so as not to obscure the distinction 
between lying and other kinds of insincere speech” (Stokke 2018: 6). 
As all defi nitions, a defi nition of lying should not be to narrow nor to 
broad, but as we shall see, the nature of lying it should capture is still a 
matter of debate. In the chapter, Stokke presents the following defi ni-
tion of lying: “A lies to B if and only if there is a proposition such that
(L1) A says that p to B, and
(L2) A proposes to make it common ground that p, and
(L3) A believes that p s false.” (31)
According to this defi nition, a lie is an insincere assertion. In the fol-
lowing chapters he defends this defi nition and explains the key con-
cepts it is built on.
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One important task is to defi ne what an assertion is. In Chapter 2 
Stokke presents a Gricean view of assertions, which he then rejects as 
inadequate. According to Stokke, the Gricean proposal is “bound to fall 
foul of particular facts concerning bald-faced lies, and concerning the 
way such a defi nition must locate lying in relation to the saying-meaning 
distinction” (38). In Chapter 3, he proposes his preferred notion of asser-
tion, one based on Stalnaker’s notion of common ground. According to 
the author, common ground information is information that is accepted 
for the purpose of the conversation. Using this notion, Stokke presents 
lies as saying something and thereby proposing that it becomes part of 
the common ground between speaker and hearer. Chapter 4 is devoted 
to the notion of what is said, and Chapter 5 to the difference between 
lying and misleading. The author argues for a notion of what is said that 
is sensitive to questions under discussion, i.e. the topic of the conversa-
tion, while being constrained by linguistic meaning. His main reason for 
characterizing lying in terms of assertion is to differentiate lying from 
non-linguistic forms of deception and insincerity. The classic contrast 
between lying and merely misleading is the contrast between asserting 
disbelieved information and conversationally implicating such informa-
tion by asserting something believed to be true.
In the second part of the book the author explores the relationship 
between what is communicated and the speaker’s attitudes. He shows 
this relation using the notion of bullshit, which is used to illustrate 
the point that insincerity is a more complex phenomenon than com-
municating what one believes to be false. Sometimes people commu-
nicate certain contents while being indifferent toward their relation 
with the truth. He argues for a shallow view of insincerity according to 
which insincerity is a matter of speaking without a conscious intention 
to communicate something one assents to, that is, an utterance is in-
sincere when it is not consciously intended to communicate something 
the speaker assents to.
Chapter 6 opens the discussion about the ways in which people 
sometimes speak while being indifferent towards what they say that 
extends to Chapter 7. In the next two chapters, Stokke defends a shal-
low conception of insincerity. According to this view, whether or not one 
speaks insincerely depends on his or her conscious state of mind, not 
on unconscious beliefs, hopes or desires. The fi nal chapter of the book, 
Chapter 10, explores the way in which we use various linguistic forms 
other than simple utterances of declarative sentences to communicate 
our attitudes in language. According to Stokke, even though non-declar-
ative utterances can be insincere, they cannot be used to tell lies.
After having briefl y presented the content of the ten chapters, I will 
proceed to comment specifi c topics Stokke deals with, concentrating 
mainly on the fi rst part of the book. The fi rst one is related to his en-
dorsement of a non-deceptionist account of lying. The second one is his 
formal distinction between lying and misleading,
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The notion of lying provided by Stokke rejects some features that lies 
are traditionally supposed to have, while arguing for the necessity of oth-
ers. There is no philosophically accepted defi nition of lying, but following 
Mahon (2016) we can identify four necessary conditions for an expression 
to be considered a lie in the traditional sense. The fi rst condition is the 
statement condition, according to which lying requires a person to make 
a statement. The second is the untruthfulness condition, that states that 
lying requires that the person believes the statement to be false. The 
third is the addressee condition, that is the idea that lying requires that 
the untruthful statement be made to another person. According to the 
last condition, lying requires that the person intends the other person 
to believe the untruthful statement to be true. This condition is labeled 
as the intention to deceive the addressee condition. If all the conditions 
are satisfi ed, we are faced with a lie in the traditional sense: a statement 
that is believed to be false made to another person with the intention 
that they believe that statement to be true.
Recently, various authors have challenged the fourth condition (see 
Carson 2006, Sorensen 2007 and Fallis 2009), claiming that lying does 
not necessarily involve an intention to deceive the addressee. Stokke 
adhered to this current in the debate in his previous work (see Stokke 
2013) and explicates his position even further in this book.
Following Carson (2006), he presents The Cheating Student exam-
ple, which should provide to the reader a clear example of a lie made 
without an intention to deceive. The example goes as follows. 
“A student accused of cheating on an exam is called to the Dean’s offi ce. The 
student knows that the Dean knows that she did in fact cheat. But as it is 
also well known that the Dean will not punish someone unless they explic-
itly admit their guilt, the student says,
(1) I didn’t cheat
Although the student says something she believes to be false, she does not 
intend to deceive the Dean. Even so, the student is lying.” (Stokke 2018: 
17, 18)
This is a classic example of what Sorensen (2007) has labeled bald-
faced lies. Stokke seems to presuppose that this idea will be accepted 
at face value by the reader. In the pages that follow after the example, 
Stokke defends his position on the basis of intuitions and on what he 
considers to be a standard sense of the word “lie”. Here are some exam-
ples of the constructions he uses: “It is highly counterintuitive to insist 
that the student in Carson’s example did not lie to the Dean“ (19); “(…) 
the insistence that the student did not lie that relies on a non-standard 
sense of the word.”(21); (…) in such cases, this statement is still intui-
tively a lie” (28); (…) the student’s utterance is still clearly a lie” (29).
I would like to suggest that in order to include this kind of cases in 
the defi nition of lying, i.e. exclude from it the intention to deceive the 
addressee condition, empirical data regarding people’s attitudes that 
would support this position should be provided, or the position should 
be backed up by arguments. Without any of these elements, readers 
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who share the author’s intuitions will be convinced that bald faced lies 
are in fact lies, but those who do not share them could remain uncon-
vinced by the examples alone.
Stokke returns to this particular example later on and explains it 
using his preferred notion of “common ground”. Following Stalnaker 
(2002), he does not view common ground in terms of a believed proposi-
tion, but he proposes to view it as a proposition accepted for the pur-
pose of the conversation (or believed to be accepted as such, or even 
just believed to be available). Applying this notion to lying we should 
say that “to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby 
propose that it be accepted by the participants and commonly believed 
to be accepted” (Stokke 2018: 52). Again, this view points to the idea 
that the intention to install false beliefs in the hearer is not necessary 
for lying. What is important for Stokke is that this notion allows some-
thing to be part of the common ground even when it is believed to be 
false. This is needed to allow bald faced lies in the defi nition of lying. 
It could be objected that this notion of acceptance is too weak. The 
hearer would accept the speaker’s proposition that p every time he un-
derstands it and is aware of the fact that the speaker wants to make 
it common ground that p. But knowing what the expressed proposition 
means and recognizing the intention of the speaker does not mean al-
lowing it into the common ground. It yet has to become information 
that will be jointly used in the conversation.
Returning to the cheating student case, the student wants it to be 
common ground that she did not cheat. That is, she does not intend 
for anyone to really believe it, but she wants it to be accepted for the 
purpose of the conversation. Still, the Dean does not have to agree to 
this. We can imagine different ends of the story: the Dean can refuse 
to accept what the student said and explain to her the repercussion of 
a false statement and schedule another meeting with her. In this case, 
the student’s assertion has not become part of the common ground, 
on the contrary, it brought the conversation to an end. Otherwise, if 
the Dean accepts the assertion and goes along with it, the conversa-
tional exchange that follows could be interpreted as “pretending”. That 
would make it similar to a play, in which none of the parties involved 
sincerely believe what they say, but they are pretending to do so in 
order to achieve some performative goal. Stoke acknowledges a similar 
objection and discusses Mahon’s (2016) idea of “pretence”. According to 
him, this kind of objection should be understood as maintaining that 
the kind of pretence involved is unserious. He rejects the objection so 
understood by presenting the fi ctional case of a trial held under a to-
talitarian regime (see Stokke 2018: 58). He invites us to imagine that 
someone is called to the stand to testify about something that is com-
monly known to be false, that is, to go on the stand and tell a bald-
faced lie. The fact that people in real life situations had chosen to be 
executed rather than to do so should prove to us, Stokke claims, that 
such “pretence” is anything but frivolous. But this example could point 
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in another direction. Being on the stand and telling a bald-faced lie 
would carry with it the additional information of accepting the author-
ity of those in power. This is the massage they do not want to commit 
to. The most salient message differs from what is said and it is exactly 
what the person on the stand wants to convey and make part of the 
common ground.
The same goes for the cheating student case. In saying that she did 
not cheat, the student is conveying the additional information that she 
knows the rules and she is going to take advantage of them. I believe 
this to be more relevant and informative that claiming that she did not 
cheat while everybody knows she did. What would be the point of that 
if no additional information is intended? I believe that this information 
is calculable in Grice’s sense, making it a conversational implicature. 
The information conveyed using conversational implicatures is exactly 
what the speaker wants to be part of the common ground, and she 
relies on the rational capacity of the hearer to reach this conclusion to 
bring the message across. Still, Stokke, rejects the idea that intended 
false implicatures should be considered lies.
 At this point it is worth presenting what Stokke labels as “bald-
faced false implicatures”. He uses the following example to illustrate 
what he has in mind (55). Thelma knows that Louise knows that Thel-
ma has been drinking. Louise asks: Are you OK to drive? And Thelma 
replies: I haven’t been drinking. Thelma implicates that she is OK to 
drive. As in the case of bald-faced lies, Thelma is not trying to get Lou-
ise to believe that she is OK to drive. In this case the false implicature 
is derived from a bald-faced lie. It is interesting to notice that the utter-
ance of “I haven’t been drinking” is considered by Stokke a bald-faced 
lie, but the implicature “I am Ok to drive”, even though it is the most 
salient piece of information, is not considered to be a lie. This refl ects 
his acceptance and strong defence of the statement condition for the 
defi nition of lying.
I believe that this position could be challenged by the introduction 
of the notion of default meaning in the discussion about lying and mis-
leading. Default meanings are those arising automatically in a given 
situation of discourse (Jaszczolt 2005, 2010). They are the most salient 
or relevant meaning in a particular context. The primary content of an 
utterance is its most salient meaning. According to Jaszczolt, this is so 
even when this meaning does not bear any resemblance to the logical 
form derived from the syntactic structure of the uttered sentence (Jaszc-
zolt 2016). I believe that applying the notion of default meaning to the 
discussion about lying would shed new light to some problematic cases.
Stokke rejects cases of falsely implicating as instances of lying, pro-
viding the following quote from Fallis (2009) to support his view: “you 
are not lying if you make a statement that you believe to be true. In 
fact, you are not lying even if you intend to deceive someone by mak-
ing this statement” (44). According to Stokke, including false implica-
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tures in the defi nition of lying “rejects one of the most fundamental 
distinctions we make about verbal insincerity (44.)”. Still, the goal of 
the authors who have tried to include false implicatures in the defi ni-
tion of lying (Stokke mentions Meibauer 2005 and Dynel 2011) is ex-
actly to question the assumed distinction between lies and other forms 
of verbal deception. It seems that Stokke rejects the suggestion that 
intended false implicatures could be considered lies because they are 
excluded from the traditional defi nition, but someone who is so eager to 
reject the idea that an intention to deceive is necessary for lying, even 
though this idea has been widely defended and accepted, should not 
reject other approaches on the basis of their unorthodoxy. Accepting 
that the cheating student is in fact implicating something, and that 
this implicature is in fact the most salient meaning of his utterance, we 
could have a good explanation for the idea that the student did not lie 
at all: the default meaning of her utterance can be paraphrased with a 
true proposition.
In Chapter 4 Stokke gives his defi nition of what is said, which is 
defi ned as the weakest answer to a question under discussion that ei-
ther entails or is entailed by a minimal proposition expressed by the 
utterance in question, given the context. Stokke’s notion of what is said 
is compositional. What is said is expressed by the minimal proposition, 
that is, a proposition that is determined solely by the composition of the 
constituents of the relevant sentence. He believes that the account of 
what is said presented in Chapter 4 draws the line correctly between 
lying and other forms of misleading speech. Still, this presupposes that 
the distinction between what is said and what is conveyed less explic-
itly matches the distinction between lying and misleading. As I have 
noted above, if we change this formal notion of what is said with the no-
tion of default meaning, which I believe to be more suited for assessing 
various communicational layers our results could be more encompass-
ing. Using Stokke’s terminology, a default meaning could be defi ned 
as the content of an utterance that optimally responds to the question 
under discussion. According to the author, communication is a coopera-
tive activity of information exchange aimed to discover how things are 
(see p. 81). It remains somehow unclear, at least to me, why confi ne the 
idea of “question under discussion” to a formal notion of what is said. 
During a regular communicational exchange speakers and hearers 
communicate explicitly and implicitly, creating meanings and trying to 
“discover how things are” jointly, mostly unaware of formal distinctions 
between semantics and pragmatics. What is more important, they com-
municate successfully, which means that the discovery of how things 
are can be achieved by implicit and indirect communicational means. 
Again, it could be objected that what is merely implicated somehow 
always remains uncertain. I believe that this could be put aside since, 
following Mercier and Sperber (2017), this “uncertainty” is a distin-
guishable feature of all every-day reasoning.
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In short, my main point so far was questioning the adequacy of a 
pure formal distinction between lying and misleading since commu-
nicators are often unaware of it, and their reliance on other people’s 
words is not exhausted by “what is said”. The same goes for lying. If I 
form a false belief o the basis of another person’s words because that 
person had an intention to affect negatively my epistemic condition is 
it really relevant if it was done with assertions or implicatures? Would 
I really care?
As it has been mention at the beginning, Stokke is not concerned 
with the moral aspects of lying. Still, it is important to note that the 
distinction between lying and misleading has important moral conse-
quences. According to the traditional view, misleading is always better 
than lying. But this position should be critically assessed taking into 
account the fact that it was a response to a general religious condem-
nation of lying. What better way to evade this strong moral position 
than to have a narrow defi nition of lying? Still, the idea has been per-
petuated by contemporary authors like Fricker, who claims that where 
what is conveyed is not explicitly asserted there is a diminution in the 
responsibility for the truth of what is got across incurred by the utterer 
(Fricker 2006). The idea that conversational implicatures can be eas-
ily denied, regardless of the plausibility of such denial certainly also 
helped view implicatures as a weak communicational strategy (see 
Pinker and Lee 2010). 
I believe that a rigid distinction between semantics and pragmatics 
is certainly useful for a formal analysis of language and speech. Dis-
covering the intricate interaction between implicit and explicit content 
we use in communication is fascinating and makes us eager to create 
new fi ne-grained distinctions, but most language users are not aware 
of these intricacies. They want to communicate, they want to say that 
someone told a lie if he or she communicated something believed to 
be false, regardless of the degree of expansion of the proposition ex-
pressed. They will tell the truth and lie using implicatures without a 
conscious effort to communicate implicitly and indirectly. 
Finally, I would like to illustrate the points I tried to make using 
a literary example. Recall Shakespeare’s Iago, a character called by 
many in the play “honest” but who is in fact plotting to convince Othello 
that his wife is having an affair. During the many dialogues between 
these two characters, Iago never utters an explicit lie about Desdemo-
na's affair, he suggests and insinuates, corroding in this way Othello’s 
belief in his wife’s fatefulness. Near the end of the play, Emilia, Iago’s 
wife, confronts her husband and asks him to explain why Othello sad 
to her that he made him believe “his wife was false”. Iago replies: “I 
told him what I thought, and told no more than what he found himself 
was apt and true” (Shakespeare 2006: 384). Whit his utterance Iago 
tries to distance himself from the belief Othello formed on the basis of 
his words, shifting the responsibility to Othello himself. Unconvinced 
by his response, Emilia asks him directly if he ever told Othello that 
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Desdemona “was false”. “I did”, replied Iago. Emilia concludes that he 
has lied: “You told a lie, an odious, damned lie”, she says (Shakespeare 
2006: 384). Why would Iago admit having lied if he never said explic-
itly that Desdemona was not being faithful unless his insinuations do 
count as lies? Moreover, I believe that the audience, acquainted with 
Iago’s malicious plans trough his monologues, would not say that Iago 
is lying only on the rare occasions in which he is using an explicit lie 
and that he is not lying when he is “merely misleading”. The subtleties 
of his deception are what makes his character interesting, but he is 
universally considered to be a liar, which would be contradictory if one 
would claim that in fact he was not lying.
To conclude, Stokke presents his ideas clearly, backing them up 
with a multitude of examples useful for testing the reader’s intuition 
about the matter at hand. Sometimes, my intuitions differ from the 
author’s, but this is exactly what made the book engaging. It is a book 
dense with concepts and theoretical questions, still, Stokke manages 
to make them accessible and easy to follow even for readers that are 
not acquainted with the ongoing debate about the discussed topics. My 
main concern is that the current debate about lying relies too much on 
a format notion of what is said that does not refl ect the way people use 
language in their everyday lives. In my view, this makes the defi nition 
of lying too narrow. Still, many of the same authors argue for a defi ni-
tion that includes bald-faced lies, which makes it simultaneously too 
broad.2
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